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ROE v. WADE AND THE LESSON OF THE 
PRE-ROE CASE LAW 
Richard Gregory Morgan*t 
The standard criticism of Roe v. Wade 1 is that the Supreme 
Court indulged in "Lochnering": the improper second-guessing of 
a legislative balance.2 Rarely does the Supreme Court invite criti-
cal outrage as it did in Roe by offering so little explanation for a 
decision that requires so much. The stark inadequacy of the 
Court's attempt to justify its conclusions - that abortion impli-
cates women's "privacy," that only the most important state in-
terests may supersede that right, and that they may do so only 
after certain stages of pregnancy- suggests to some scholars that 
the Court, finding no justification at all in the Constitution, una-
bashedly usurped the legislative function. 3 Professor Ely, the first 
to cry "Lochner," could only adduce from the opinion that the 
Court "manufactured a constitutional right out of whole cloth 
and used it to superimpose its own view of wise social policy on 
those of the legislatures. "4 Even some who approve Roe's form of 
judicial review concede that the opinion itself is inscrutable. G 
* Law Clerk, The Honorable J. Edward Lumbard, United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit. A.B. 1976, University of California at Los Angeles; J.D. 1979, 
University of Michigan - Ed. 
t Being an avid reader of authors' acknowledgments (because it's fun to see who 
knows whom), I have often read "I would never have completed this work without the 
invaluable encouragement of So-and-So." But being young, energetic, and imbued with 
a work ethic, I have never understood how anyone could even think of not completing a 
task once begun - until, for a variety of circumstances they know, I found myself unable 
to continue this paper without the daily support of Ginny Popper and Carl and Joan 
Schneider. Thanks guys. 
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
2. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe u. Wade, 82 YALE 
L.J. 920 (1973). 
3. See Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 
1973 SUP. CT. REV. 159, 184-85: 
Roe u. Wade is symptomatic of the analytical poverty possible in constitutional 
litigation .... Thus in the end we must criticize both Mr. Justice Blackmun in 
Roe u. Wade and the entire method of constitutional interpretation that allows the 
Supreme Court in the name of Due Process both to "define" and to "balance" 
interests on the major social and political issues of our time. 
4. Ely, supra note 2, at 937. 
5. See Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term - Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles 
in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REv.1, 7 (1973) ("One of the most curious 
things about Roe is that, behind its own verbal smokescreen, the substantive judgment 
on which it rests is nowhere to be found."). 
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Critics have cried "Lochner!" before, however, and that wor-
ries Professor Ely, who fears that the specter of past mistakes may 
lose its awe by becoming too familiar. 6 But more was at stake in 
the Supreme Court's handling of Roe than the wrath of critics: 
By taking an abortion case when it did, the Court forestalled the 
development of one of its ·traditional aids for deciding difficult 
questions - a thoughtful lower-court case law. 
Supreme Court decisions are often thought of as if they have 
no history, somehow beginning and ending in the Supreme Court. 
But they are products of a judicial system, one that traditionally 
adheres to certain axioms that protect and enhance the quality 
of Supreme Court review. One axiom posits that the Supreme 
Court should hesitate to decide disputes which the political 
branch is still actively debating. Beyond observing the well-
established "political questions" doctrine, the Court respects the 
representativeness of government and deepens the thoughtfulness 
of its own deliberations if it stays out of a dispute until legisla-
tures and executives make an initial decision. 7 A second axiom 
cautions that even after a dispute reaches the judicial system, the 
Supreme Court should still hesitate to hear a specific case until 
lower courts have "aged" the dispute by articulating the best 
arguments on both sides and discarding the unpersuasive or irrel-
evant. 8 
The Supreme Court completely disregarded both those ax-
ioms in Roe. The politically unsettled and judicially confused law 
of abortion in 1971 and 1972, when the Court twice heard argu-
ments and deliberated Roe, should have warned it not to decide 
the case. By doing so; the Court thrust itself into a political de-
bate and stunted the development of a thoughtful lower-court 
case law. If the Court did perceive the warnings but continued 
toward a decision anyway, perhaps trusting that its own consider-
6. Ely, supra note 2, at 943-44. 
7. Cf. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 115 (1962) ("standing" and "case and 
controversy" help make sound judicial decisions by letting courts see legislation's practi-
cal consequences before they decide). 
8. See Youngstown Steel & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 937, 938 (1952) (Burton, 
J., dissenting from grant of certiorari): 
The constitutional issue which is the subject of the appeal deserves for its solution 
all of the wisdom which our judicial system makes available. The need for sound-
ness in the result outweighs the need for speed in reaching it. The Nation is entitled 
to the substantial value inherent in an intermediate consideration of the issue by 
the Court of Appeals. Little time will be lost and none will be wasted in seeking it. 
The time taken will be available also for constructive consideration by the parties 
of their own positions and responsibilities. 
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able wits would devise an answer the lower courts had not, the 
result suggestB--that the judicial system's axioms deserve more 
respect than they received. This Article, by showing briefly in 
Section I that the Court should not have decided an abortion case 
when it did, and by showing at more length in Section II that the 
Court could find no persuasive rationale in the pre-Roe cases for 
each of the points in its decision, argues that Roe was almost 
destined to be a bad opinion. 
I. 
In 1973, political forces were still vigorously debating abor-
tion. Most states had prohibited abortions, except to save a 
woman's life, since the nineteenth century, 9 but a movement was 
afoot to relax that restriction. In the five years immediately pre-
ceding Roe, thirteen states had revised their statutes to resemble 
the Model Penal Code's provisions, 10 which allowed abortions not 
only if the pregnancy threatened the woman's life, but also if it 
would gravely impair her physical or mental health, if it resulted 
from rape or incest, or if the child would be born with grave 
physical or mental defects. 11 Four states had removed all restric-
tions on the permissible reasons for seeking an abortion before a 
pregnancy passed specified lengths. 12 Furthermore, as the Su-
preme Court noted in Roe, both the American Medical Associa-
tion and the American Bar Association had only recently changed 
their official views on abortion (and not without opposition) .13 
The abortion debate was not merely one of how far to relax re-
strictions, however. At least one of the states whose restrictive 
statutes were judicially invalidated had in 1972 reaffirmed its 
determination to prohibit abortions unless necessary to save the 
woman's life.14 And since several of the pre-Roe constitutional 
challenges were raised by defendants in state abortion prosecu-
tions, 15 it is clear that at least those states had not allowed their 
9. See the Supreme Court's survey in Roe of the history of abortion and abortion laws, 
410 U.S. at 138-39. 
10. See Comment, A Survey of the Present Statutory and Case Law on Abortion: The 
Contradictions and Problems, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 177, 180. 
11. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
12. See Comment, supra note 10, at 181. 
13. 410 U.S. at 143, 146. 
14. See Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224, 226 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated and 
remanded, 410 U.S. 951 (1973). 
15. YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (D.N.J. 1972), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989, 
affd. without opinion, 493 F.2d 1402 (3d Cir. 1974); Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of 
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abortion statutes to lapse into desuetude. 16 In short, the political 
process in many states had yet to decide on abortion. But Roe's 
sweeping rejection of Texas's statute voided almost every other 
state's as well.17 
Especially given the absence of a firm constitutional footing 
for deciding the question, the Court could sensibly have refrained 
from stepping into the debate when it did. Of course, the Court 
might never decide anything if it always waited for the last politi-
cal word, and had Roe been a soundly reasoned opinion, the Court 
would surely never have been criticized for being a bit hasty. 
Indeed, because several states had liberalized their abortion stat-
utes, some might argue that the Court should nudge the rest of 
the nation toward recognizing the right those states had found. 
But the second traditional axiom should still have warned the 
Court not to decide Roe: the dispute had not sufficiently steeped 
in the lower courts. Allegations that abortion statutes violated a 
constitutiqnal right of privacy were new to the ·courts. As late as 
mid-1968, the New Jersey Supreme Court flatly rejected two de-
fendants' claim that the state statute's exception for abortions 
with "lawful justification" included abortions to end unwanted 
pregnancies: "It is beyond comprehension that the defendants 
could have believed that our abortion statute envisioned lawful 
justification to exist whenever a woman wanted to avoid having 
a child. The statutes of no jurisdiction in this country permit such 
an excuse for an abortion. " 18 The court's construction of "lawful 
justification" was undoubtedly correct; the significant point is 
that the court gave no hint of even considering that a right of 
privacy might justify such an excuse. The landmark case of 
People v. Belous, 19 apparently the first case to.consider a right-
Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970), vacated and remanded, 412 U.S. 
902 (1973); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed per 
curiam, 400 U.S. 1 (1970); United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969), 
revd., 402 U.S. 62 (1971); People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 
354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970); State v. Barquet, Fla., 262 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 
1972); People v. Nixon, 42 Mich. App. 332, 201 N.W.2d 635 (1972), remanded, 389 Mich. 
809, revd., 50 Mich. App. 38, 212 N.W.2d 797 (1973) (per curiam). 
16. See generally A. BICKEL, supra note 7, at 148. Indeed, even after Babbitz v. 
McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed per curiam, 400 U.S. 1 (1970), 
declared Wisconsin's restrictive abortion statute unconstitutional, _the state attorney gen-
eral continued to threaten prosecution. Babbitz v. McCann, 320 F. Supp. 219, 221 (E.D. 
Wis. 1970), vacated, 402 U.S. 903 (1971). 
17. See 410 U.S. at 118; Ely, supra note 2, at 920. 
18. State v. Moretti, 52 N.J. 182, 194, 244 A.2d 499, 505-06, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 
952 (1968). ' 
19. 71 Cal. 2d 954,458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 
(1970). 
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of-privacy challenge to an abortion statute and certainly the first 
reported case to endorse one,20 was decided only in September 
1969, less than two years before the Supreme Court decided to 
hear Roe. 21 Between 1970 and 1972, a flurry of constitutional 
challenges hit the courts, but of the seventeen courts that decided 
right-of-privacy claims, twelve were three-judge district courts 
whose judgments allowed direct appeal to the Supreme Court.22 
Thus, when the Court had Roe before it and looked, as the 
axiom has it, to the lower-court deliberations,23 it found not one 
federal decision that had received intermediate appellate con-
sideration, and only four decisions of state supreme courts, 24 none 
of which offered particularly illuminating analysis. 
In general, three years is hardly time enough for the judicial 
system to evolve sound analysis for most constitutional issues, 
and for so emotionally charged an issue as abortion,25 three years 
20. See Comment, supra note 10, at 184. 
21. The Supreme Court decid!ld on May 3, 1971 to hear arguments on jurisdiction 
and the merits. 402 U.S. 941 (1971). 
22. Decisions by three-judge district courts: Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. 
Conn. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 951 (1973); Crossen v. Attorney Gen., 344 
F. Supp. 587 (E.D. Ky. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 960 (1973); YWCA v. 
Kugler, 342 F. Supp.1048 (D.N.J. 1972), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989, affd. without opinion, 
493 F.2d 1402 (3d Cir. 1974); Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated 
and remanded, 410 U.S. 951 (1973); Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp, 986 (D. Kan. 1972); 
Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 
950 (1973); Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971), vacated and remanded, 410 
U.S. 950 (1973); Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Doe v. Bolton, 
319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970), modified and affd., 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Rosen v. 
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970), vacated 
and remanded, 412 U.S. 902 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970), 
affd. in part and revd. in part, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp, 293 
(E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed per curiam, 400 U.S. 1 (1970). Decision by one-judge dis-
trict court: United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969), revd. 402 U.S. 62 
(1971). Decisions by state supreme courts: People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 
80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970); Cheaney v. State, 259 Ind. 138, 
285 N.E.2d 265 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973); Rogers v. Danforth, 486 S.W.2d 
258 (Mo. 1972) (en bane); State v. Munson, 86 S.D. 663, 201 N.W.2d 123 (1972), vacated 
and remanded, 410 U.S. 950 (1973). 
23. Of course one way in which the Supreme Court "looks" at lower-court decisions 
is through the parties' and amici briefs. The briefs submitted to the Court for Roe are 
generally susceptible to all the criticisms levelled at the lower courts, leaving the Supreme 
Court, like T.S. Eliot's self-possessed gallant, "really in the dark." 
24. See note 22 supra. 
25. The emotions surrounding abortion were not lost on the courts. Although the 
Supreme Court professed "to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of 
emotion and of predilection," 410 U.S. at 116, not all the lower-court judges could have 
said the same. See, e.g., Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp, 
1217, 1229 (E.D. La. 1970), vacated and remanded, 412 U.S. 902 (1973) ("This problem 
involves the condition of pregnancy and its likely consequence, the first entrance of a new 
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was very little time indeed. The Court could justifiably have let 
the dispute simmer longer in the lower courts. And technically, 
the Court could have done so. In Roe, both parties appealed the 
lower-court decision to the Supreme Court: Jane Roe from the 
denial of an injunction against enforcement of the statute, and 
District Attorney Wade from the grant of a declaratory judgment 
that the statute was unconstitutional.26 But as the Court ac-
knowledged, its own cases "are to the effect that§ 1253 does not 
authorize an appeal to this Court from the grant or denial of 
declaratory relief alone."27 Thus, only Roe's complaint from the 
denial of an injunction was properly before the Court on appeal. 
Nonetheless, the Court held that "those decisions do not foreclose 
our review of both the injunctive and declaratory aspects of a case 
of this kind when it is properly here, as this one is, on appeal 
under § 1253 from specific denial of injunctive relief, and the 
arguments as to both aspects are necessarily identical."28 Even if 
the arguments as to both aspects were strictly speaking identical 
(which they probably were only if the Court wished them to be), 
the Court still did not have to decide the constitutional question. 
It could have stayed the direct appeal on the injunction until the 
appeal on the declaratory judgment had progressed to the Court 
through the court of appeals, as technically that appeal should 
have done.29 The reason for doing so would have been clear: a 
decision on the injunction should logically await a decision on 
constitutionality (the declaratory judgment issue) and a decision 
on constitutionality should await a fuller consideration by the 
courts of appeals. Instead, worried that "[i]t would be destruc-
tive of time and energy for all concerned were we to rule other-
player, 'mewling and puking,' onto the world stage. Shakespeare, As You Like It, Act ii, 
sc. 7, 1, 139."); Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194,286 N.E.2d 
887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972) (dissent of Burke, J., who condemned New York's liberal 
abortion statute by dismissing women's "self-created problem" of injuries from illegal 
abortions, 31 N.Y.2d at 207, 286 N.E.2d at 893, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 398, by decrying "the 
massacre of the innocents," 31 N.Y.2d at 209-10, 286 N.E.2d at 894, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 400, 
and by lamenting, "The deeper disease in this legislation is the widening gap between 
the American self-image of a country that values human life and the reality of a growing 
preoccupation of the hedonists with a competitive drive for La Dolce Vita." 31 N.Y.2d at 
211, 286 N.E.2d at 895, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 402 (emphasis original)), appeal dismissed, 410 
U.S. 949 (1973). 
26. 410 U.S. at 122. 
27. 410 U.S. at 123. 
28. 410 U.S. at 123. 
29. Interestingly, the Court dismissed for want of jurisdiction the defendant's appeal 
from the grant of a declaratory judgment in Roe's companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 
U.S. 179, 187 (1973). 
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wise, "30 the Court reached out to grab the abortion question and 
thereby impaired its ability to construct a sound opinion, some-
thing much more valuable than time and energy.31 
II. 
Even though abortion was a new issue to the courts, and even 
though no federal court of appeals had considered it, the Supreme 
Court might still have been justified in hearing Roe, for it had 
been decided by a three-judge district court, and theory has it 
that "[t]here is little to be gained by delaying important litiga-
tion of that sort that initially commands an extraordinary district 
court of three judges - at least one of them a circuit judge - for 
review by three other judges on a court of appeals. "32 In this 
instance, however, that theory proved false, and had done so even 
before the Supreme Court heard rearguments of Roe. 33 The dis-
trict court oases failed to develop any adequate analysis for de-
ciding the constitutionality of abortion statutes; indeed, most 
of them never honestly acknowledged the competing interests 
involved. There is some indication that a sounder case law might 
have evolved if given time.34 But that was prevented by Roe, 
where the Supreme Court, without offering any sound reason of 
. its own, took each step of its decision in the face of the inability 
of the lower courts that considered those steps to reach a reasoned 
conclusion. In 1973 the Court could not find a rationale, but 
decided anyway. That smacks distinctly of a legislative process. 
A. "This right of privacy . . . is broad enough . . . . " 
As do most discussions of the right of privacy, the Supreme 
Court's began by conceding that "[t]he Constitution does not 
explicitly mention any [such] right. "35 A long line of cases, how-
ever, has recognized in several amendments "a guarantee of cer-
tain areas or zones of privacy," and "makels] it clear that the 
right has some extension to activities relating to" marriage, pro-
creation, contraception, family relations, child rearing, and edu-
30. 410 U.S. at 123. 
31. See note 8 supra. 
32. 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 
JURISDICTION § 4040, at 78 (1969). 
33. The last of the important pre-Roe cases, Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. 
Conn. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 951 (1973), was announced on September 
20, 1972. The Supreme Court heard reargument on October 11, 1972. 
34. See text at notes 86-88 and 113-29 infra. 
35. 410 U.S. at 152. 
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cation.36 A less informative phrase than "has some extension to" 
is hard to imagine, but the Court gives no more information than 
that before declaring, "This right of privacy . . . is broad enough 
to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy. "37 The Court then lists several detriments that might 
befall women if they were altogether denied the choice of abor-
tion. 38 The opinion leaves ambiguous whether the Court meant 
this list somehow to prove that abortion fits within "privacy," or 
only to suggest the variety of considerations that will surround 
the exercise of that right, 39 but it does make clear that these 
potential detriments do not imply any "unlimited right to do with 
one's body as one pleases."40 
The inadequacy of that explanation is ob~ious. It does not 
explain why the right of privacy, just because it extends to some 
matters of sex and family, extends to abortion; nor what kind of 
"privacy" abortion involves (especially given that the Court later 
distinguished this "privacy" from that involved in all the other 
activities to which the right extends41); nor why the list of detri-
ments brings abortion within the right, if that is what the list 
means to do; nor why the right apparently extends to women who 
incur none of these detriments ( especially if it is the detriments 
that warrant extending the right).42 But like the right of privacy 
itself, Roe's inadequacy inheres in a long line of cases. The pre-
Roe, lower-court decisions that struck down abortion statutes for 
impairing the right of privacy wholly neglected legal analysis. In 
virtually all the cases, the proponents of abortion argued the 
same simplistic theory - that abortion involves both family and 
36. 410 U.S. at 152-53. 
37. 410 U.S. at 153. 
38. 410 U.S. at 153. 
39. Professor Ely guesses that the Court's "conclusion is thought to derive from the 
passage that immediately follows it." Ely, supra note 2, at 932. Professor Tribe seems to 
agree that avoiding these detriments is the gravamen of this right of privacy. Tribe, supra 
note 5, at 10. But neither mentions the paragraph's last sentence, which immediately 
follows the catalog of detriments: "All these are .factors the woman and her responsible 
physician necessarily will consider in consultation." 410 U.S. at 153. That sentence sug-
gests that the Court simply meant by the catalog to guide the considerations of the 
physicians in whom it places so much trust ("The abortion decision in all its aspects is 
inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with 
the physician." 410 U.S. at 166), not that the catalog somehow proves that abortion 
implicates privacy. As Professor Ely said, "Confusing signals are emitted ...• " Ely, 
supra note 2, at 922. 
40. 410 U.S. at 154. 
41. 410 U.S. at 159. 
42. See Ely, supra note 2, at 923 n.26. 
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sex, and that Griswold v. Connecticut43 and Eisenstadt v. Baird44 
place a zone of privacy around such matters45 - and most of the 
courts agreed without a second thought. 
The first case to declare an abortion statute unconstitu-
tional, People v. Belous, 46 exemplifies the lower courts' response 
to this theory. The opinion's entire explanation for including 
abortion within the right of privacy runs: 
The fundamental right of the woman to choose whether to 
bear children follows from the Supreme Court's and this court's 
repeated acknowledgment of a "right to privacy" or "liberty" in 
matters related to marriage, family, and sex .... That such a 
right is not enumerated in either the United States or California 
Constitutions is no impediment to the existence of the right.47 
No "impediment," perhaps, but the absence of any explicit right 
or privacy within the Constitution should have suggested to the 
court that it do more to support its holding than simply assert 
that the right exists and that a right of abortion follows from it. 4K 
That arguments can be made to defend extending the right of 
privacy to abortion is beside the point, for arguments can be 
made against it too. The point is that the Belous court, like many 
of the lower courts and like the Supreme Court itself in Roe, never 
even acknowledged that arguments exist. Once Belous was de-
cided, however, precedent existed - albeit of dubious value -
and in a follow-the-leader style a second court cited Belous to 
support its decision, 49 a third court cited Belous and the second, no 
and so on until the Supreme Court cited them all.51 Yet the most 
the Supreme Court could say was that those cases generally 
43. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
44. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
45. See, e.g., Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated and 
remanded, 410 U.S. 951 (1973); Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 745 (N.D, Ohio 
1970); Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1054 (N.D. Ga. 1970), modified and affd., 410 
U.S. 179 (1973). 
46. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 916 
(1970). 
47. 71 Cal. 2d at 963, 458 P.2d at 199-200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359-60 (citations omitted), 
48. Cf. Ely, supra note 2, at 928 n.58 (The Supreme Court's "inability to pigeonhole 
confidently the right involved is not important in and of itself. It might, however, have 
alerted the Court to what is an importan.t question: whether the Constitution speaks to 
the matter at all." (emphasis original)). 
49. Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293, 300 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed per 
curiam, 400 U.S. 1 (1970). 
50. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1222 (N.D. Tex. 1970), affd. in part and revd. 
in part, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
51. 410 U.S. at 154. 
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"reached the same conclusion,"52 that they "agreed that the right 
of privacy, however based, is broad enough to cover the abortion 
decision."53 Just how they reached that conclusion the Court nec-
essarily left unexplained. 
Those courts that did attempt an explanation, Doe v. Scott54 
for instance, usually drew the analogy between contraception and 
abortion: 
We do not agree with the defendants that the choice whether 
to have a child is protected before conception but is not so pro-
tected immediately after conception has occurred. A woman's in-
terest in privacy and in control over her body is just as seriously 
interfered with by a law which prohibits abortions as it is by a law 
which prohibits the use of contraceptives. 55 
Although less cryptic than Belous, this is hardly more persuasive. 
Certainly abortion statutes interfere with women's interests as 
seriously as do restrictions on the use of contraceptives. But why 
does a right to resist interference with the use of contraceptives 
equal a right to resist interference with abortion? If because 
women may control their own bodies, as Scott suggests, then the 
analogy reads into Griswold a rationale that simply is not there. 56 
If for some other reason, then what? The analogy to contraception 
is not a complete argument for placing abortion within the right 
of "privacy."57 It is, nonetheless, about the only argument the 
pre-Roe courts made. 
One case, Abele v. Markle, 58 did try something slightly differ-
ent. The court still relied on the questionable reading that 
Griswold and Eisenstadt apply to abortion, but in describing 
women's interests it said: 
52. 410 U.S. at 154. 
53. 410 U.S. at 155. 
54. 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 951 (1973). 
55. 321 F. Supp. at 1390 (footnote omitted). 
56. See Ely, supra note 2, at 929-30, 929 n.68. The Supreme Court expressly rejected 
in Roe the theory of unimpairable bodily control, 410 U.S. at 154, and characterized 
Griswold as a case about "marital intimacy," 410 U.S. at 159; but even before Doe v. 
Scott, at least one court had already refused (although without explanation) to read into 
Griswold a theory of bodily control. Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1055 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 
1970), modified and affd., 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
57. See Epstein, supra note 3, at 170. 
58. 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 951 (1973). 
There are two cases entitled Abele v. Markle. The first, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972), 
struck down the restrictive abortion statute Connecticut had originally passed in 1860. 
The second, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1972), struck down the substantially identical 
statute Connecticut passed in response to the first Abele decision. See text at note 113 
infra. 
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The decision to carry and bear a child has extraordinary rami-
fications for a woman. Pregnancy entails profound physical 
changes. Childbirth presents some danger to life and health. Bear-
ing and raising a child demands difficult psychological and social 
adjustments. The working or student mother frequently must cur-
tail or end her employment or educational opportunities. The 
mother with an unwanted child may find that it overtaxes her and 
her family's financial or emotional resources. The unmarried 
mother will suffer the stigma of having an illegitimate child. Thus, 
determining whether or not to bear a child is of fundamental im-
portance to a woman. 59 
The similarity between this list and the Supreme Court's in Roe 
is obvious.80 Unfortunately, even assuming that the Court con-
sciously adopted this particular argument (and without a word-
by-word borrowing, an assumption is all that is warranted), what 
the Court meant by "privacy" remains a mystery, for this argu-
ment leaves unanswered why the state may regulate any number 
of decisions with equally "extraordinary ramifications. " 61 
Finally, another of the pre-Roe cases, Doe v. Bolton, 62 not 
only failed to offer any rationale, but tossed off its conclusion so 
cavalierly that one wonders whether the court really knew what 
it meant: "For whichever reason, the concept of personal liberty 
embodies a right to privacy which apparently is also broad 
enough to include the decision to abort a pregnancy. 2" And in 
footnote 2: "We see no connection between this theory and the 
claimed right of a woman 'to use her body in any way she wishes' 
read into Griswold by some."83 That is no way for a court to 
expound a Constitution. 
Given this complete failure of the lower courts to argue per-
suasively for extending the right of privacy to abortion, it is 
hardly surprising that the Supreme Court had nothing to justify 
its decision. The lower courts offered it no guidance, nor did the 
proponents in Roe, whose briefs argued more expansively but 
relied largely on the inconclusive arguments that had proved suc-
cessful thus far.84 In short, the pre-Roe cases forged a trail that 
the Supreme Court followed as if dutifully. That is surprising. 
Lower courts help to prepare disputes for Supreme Court review, 
but the Court obviously need not follow lower courts that cannot 
59. 342 F. Supp. at 801-02 (footnote omitted). 
60. Compare 342 F. Supp. at 801-02 with 410 U.S. at 153. 
61. See Ely, supra note 2, at 932 n.81. 
62. 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970), modified and affd., 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
63. 319 F. Supp. at 1055 n.2. 
64. Brief for Appellants at 91-124, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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articulate persuasive reasons for doing so. And yet the Court did 
just that. 
B. "Where certain 'fundamental' rights are involved . " 
In the course of its curiously dim elucidation of privacy, the 
Supreme Court said, "These decisions make it clear that only 
personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty' . . . are included in this guarantee 
of personal privacy."65 With just that label - "fundamental" -
the Court ordained the demands of its review: only "compelling 
state interests" would justify abridging the right. 66 Irritated by 
the Court's reliance on equal protection precedent in this due 
process case, and presumably by the offhanded manner in which 
the Court found so disputed a right as abortion "implicit in . . . 
ordered liberty," Justice Rehnquist dissented, "Unless I misap-
prehend the consequences of this transplanting of the 'compelling 
state interest test,' the Court's opinion will accomplish the seem-
ingly impossible feat of leaving this area of the law more confused 
than it found it."67 But in fact, Roe left this area only as confused 
as it found it. The pre-Roe cases that found the right of privacy 
broad enough to include abortion had already distorted the con-
cept of fundamental rights. 
Identifying those rights that are "fundamental," in that they 
are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," is a difficult task 
in itself, but it rightly demands of courts especial clarity and 
persuasiveness, because of the extraordinary protection a right 
once deemed fundamental acquires against legieilative encroach-
ment. Thus Justice Harlan wrote: 
Each new claim to Constitutional protection must be consiq.-
ered against a background of Constitutional purposes, as they have 
been rationally perceived and historically developed . . . . The 
decision of an apparently novel claim must depend on grounds 
which follow closely on well-accepted principles and criteria. The 
new decision must take "its place in relation to what went before 
and further [cut] a channel for what is to come.'.'68 
And thus it is incredible that without a hint of explanation the 
court in People v. Belous announced "[t]he fundamental right 
65. 410 U.S. at 152 (citation omitted). 
66. 410 U.S. at 155. 
67. 410 U.S. at 173. 
68. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation omit-
ted). 
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of the woman to choose whether to bear children. "69 If the court 
had convincingly shown that a right of abortion follows from the 
Supreme Court's privacy cases, it would have taken the first step 
toward showing that right fundamental. It was content instead to 
apply the label, and the courts that followed it were content to 
march in lockstep behind. Babbitz v. McCann, for example, cred-
ited Belous with showing that a right of abortion "is a fundamen-
tal liberty that is implicit in the penumbrae of the Bill of Rights, 
and is supported, by analogy, in many past decisions."70 Then the 
lower-court Roe v. Wade relied on Belous and Babbitz, 11 and Doe 
v. Scott relied on all three,72 plus the lower-court United States 
v. Vuitch, which never said a word about fundamental rights. 73 
The misuse of the fundamental rights concept became unmistak-
able in the lower-court Roe, which said, "Freedom to choose in 
the matter of abortions has been accorded the status of a 
'fundamental' right in every case coming to the attention of this 
Court . . . . " 74 Merely counting judicial votes for bestowing 
super-protection is exactly what courts are not supposed to do. 
But that is what the lower courts and the Supreme Court did. 
C. "The appellee . . . argue[s] that the fetus is a 
'person' . . . . " 
To respond to Texas's argument that "the fetus is a 'person' 
within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, "75 the Supreme Court listed each use of "person" in the 
Constitution, adroitly adduced that "in nearly all these instan-
ces, the use of the word is such that it has application only post-
natally, "76 and concluded, "All this, together with our observa-
tion . . . that throughout the major portion of the 19th century 
prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are 
today, persuades us that the word 'person,' as used in the Four-
teenth Amendment, does not include the unbom."77 Professor 
69. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 963, 458 P.2d 194, 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359 (1969) (emphasis 
added), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970). 
70. 310 F. Supp. 293, 300 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed per curiam, 400 U.S. 1 (1970), 
71. 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1222 (N.D. Tex. 1970), affd. in part and reud. in part, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973). 
72. 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1390 (N.D. Ill. 1971), uacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 950 
(1973). 
73. 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (D.D.C. 1969), reud., 402 U.S. 62 (1971). 
74. 314 F. Supp. at 1222. 
75. 410 U.S. at 156. 
76. 410 U.S. at 157. 
77. 410 U.S. at 158. 
August 1979] Pre-Roe Case Law 1737 
Ely, evidently touched by the irony of the Court's sudden alle-
giance to the letter of the Constitution, found "[t]he canons of 
construction employed here . . . most intriguing when they are 
contrasted with those invoked to derive the -constitutional right 
to an abortion."78 
The irony appeared in pre-Roe case law as well. Although 
most of the lower courts, including those that upheld abortion 
statutes, never addressed this issue, two courts faced it squarely 
when purported guardians ad litem alleged that abortions uncon-
stitutionally deprive fetuses of life. In both McGarvey v. Magee-
Womens Hospital, where the guardian claimed that even Penn-
sylvania's traditional restrictive statute was unconstitutional for 
allowing abortions without "some form of judicial process,"79 and 
Byrn v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., where the 
guardian argued that New York's liberal statute was unconstitu-
tional for ever allowing abortions except to save the woman's 
life, 80 the courts found that the fourteenth amendment does not 
include fetuses, and they therefore emphatically disclaimed any 
authority to disturb the legislative balances.81 Both courts are to 
be praised for their restraint, but it is ironic that in the midst of 
judicial legislation to expand abortion, the two courts asked to 
restrict it invoked judicial restraint. That is especially ironic 
because had the courts wished to expand fetal protection, they 
could arguably have relied, given the generally low level of analy-
sis in the pre-Roe cases, on the earlier anti-abortion decision in 
Steinberg v. Brown.82 Casually relying on the defendant's biology 
and Webster's dictionary, the court in Steinberg had decided 
that life begins at conception and that " [ o ]nee human life has 
commenced, the constitutional protections found in the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments impose upon the state the duty of 
safeguarding it."83 Of course, Steinberg's effort to draw fetuses 
within the fourteenth amendment by deciding from scanty evi-
dence when life begins had itself been judicial legislation (al-
though paradoxically it supported the balance it second-guessed). 
As a whole, the pre-Roe courts, like the Supreme Court, seem to 
78. Ely, supra note 2, at 926. 
79. 340 F. Supp. 751, 752 (W.D. Pa. 1972), affd., 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973). 
80. 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972), appeal dismissed, 410 
U.S. 949 (1973). 
81. McGarvey: 340 F. Supp. at 754; Byrn: 31 N.Y.2d at 203,286 N.E.2d at 890,335 
N.Y.S.2d at 395. 
82. 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1970). 
83. 321 F. Supp. at 746-47. 
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have found second-guessing a handy resort when needed, but not 
the kind of girl one wants to marry. 
To bolster its decision that a fetus is not a "person," the 
Supreme Court said, "Indeed, our decision in United States v. 
Vuitch . . . inferentially is to the same effect, for we there would 
not have indulged in statutory interpretation favorable to abor-
tion in specified circumstances if the necessary consequence was 
the termination of life entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protec-
tion. "84 That statement is a bit disingenuous, for the Court in 
Vuitch expressly - which is more than "inferentially" - de-
clined to discuss any aspect of the privacy arguments made by 
the appellee. 85 That notwithstanding, the Court can surely apply 
interpretative glosses to its own opinions, and this gloss had the 
advantage of being ready-made. In strikingly similar language, 
Abele v. Markle had previously said, "Surely the Court would 
have withheld even tacit approval of abortions in such circum-
stances if the consequence was the termination of a life entitled 
to fourteenth amendment protection."86 In this instance, then, 
the traditional axiom was at work: the lower court identified and 
articulated an argument that aided Supreme Court review. Un-
fortunately, Abele's gloss on Vuitch was a rather minor point; but 
still more unfortunately, the Court· settled for plucking it out of 
a much larger argument. Abele held that "person" does not in-
clude a fetus and specifically referred to Vuitch in the course of 
arguing that a state cannot almost totally abridge women's con-
stitutional rights by asserting an interest in fetuses which have 
no constitutional rights.87 That theory is debatable, and even 
Abele stated it tentatively,88 but it was one step toward a more 
84. 410 U.S. at 159. 
85. Interestingly, the Supreme Court not only avoided discussing the arguments, it 
conspicuously avoided even using the word "privacy": 
Appellee has suggested that there are other reasons why the dismissal of the indict-
ments should be affirmed. Essentially, these arguments are based on this Court's 
decision in Griswold v. Connecticut . . . . Although there was some reference to 
these arguments in the opinion of the court below, we read it as holding simply that 
the statute was void for vagueness . . .. Since that question of vagueness was the 
only issue passed upon by the District Court it is the only issue we reach here. 
402 U.S. 62, 72-73 (1971) (citation omitted). Neither the district court nor the appellee, 
however, had been reluctant to invoke the right of privacy. See United States v. Vuitch, 
305 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (D.D.C. 1969), revd., 402 U.S. 62 (1971); Brief for Milan M. 
Vuitch, M.D., at 40-44, United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971). 
86. 351 F. Supp. 224, 228 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 951 
(1973). 
87. 351 F. Supp. at 228-30. 
88. 351 F. Supp. at 230. 
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precise definition of the state interest necessary to abridge consti-
tutional rights than the conclusory tags "rational" and 
"compelling." By deciding Roe too soon, the Supreme Court af-
forded itself only the minor point, precluded any judicial debate 
of Abele's theory, and pinned itself to an obfuscating method with 
"'compelling' points."89 
D. "We need not resolve the difficult question of when life 
begins .... " 
Having decided that the Constitution does not protect fe-
tuses, the Supreme Couh turned to Texas's statutory claim: 
"Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life 
begins at conception and is present throughout pregnancy, and 
that, therefore, the State has a compelling interest in protecting 
that life from and after conception. "90 In response, the Court 
quickly abjured any attempt to decide when life begins, 91 noting 
instead that this question yields a "wide divergence of think-
ing,"92 and that "[i]n areas other than criminal abortion, the law 
has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we recognize 
it, begins before live birth."93 How those observations lead to the 
conclusion that states may protect fetuses only after viability is 
a mystery. The critics have particularly dismissed this portion of 
Roe as the merest dissemblance of a rationale. 94 And the Court's 
dissembling at this point undercut the purported purpose of its 
opinion: to discern the relative weights of the interests involved. 95 
By busying itself with the question of what a fetus is - "life," 
"potential life," a "person," a person "in the whole sense" - the 
Court avoided admitting that something hangs in the balance 
against women's rights and thus avoided the real question of 
whether states may protect fetuses, as nothing more than fetuses, 
and at what cost to women. 96 
This avoidance was the legacy of the pre-Roe cases. The 
courts that struck down abortion statutes for abridging women's 
right of privacy essentially denied that a fetus is anything at all. 
89. 410 U.S. at 163. 
90. 410 U.S. at 159. 
91. 410 U.S. at 159. 
92. 410 U.S. at 160. 
93. 410 U.S. at 161. 
94. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 2, at 924-26; Epstein, supra note 3, at 180-85; Tribe, 
supra note 5, at 3-5. 
95. 410 U.S. at 162, 165. 
96. See Ely, supra note 2,- at 933. 
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As Professor Ely said, "a fetus may not be a 'person in the whole 
sense,' but it is certainly not nothing."97 The lower courts pre-
tended otherwise. In People v. Belous, the court said: 
It is next urged that the state has a compelling interest in the 
protection of the embryo and fetus and that such interest warrants 
the limitation on the woman's constitutional rights. Reliance is 
placed upon several statutes and court rules which assertedly show 
that the embryo or fetus is equivalent to a born child. However, 
all of the statutes and rules relied upon require a live birth or 
reflect the interest of the parents. 
In any event, there are major and decisive areas where the 
embryo and fetus are not treated as equivalent to the born child.08 
Satisfied that a fetus is not equivalent to a born child, the Belous 
court thought its task complete. But why must a fetus be 
"equivalent to a born child" before the state may protect it? A 
fetus is a fetus. The court never considered the straightforward 
question "Can the state protect a fetus?" without regard to 
whether a fetus is like something else the state protects else-
where. 99 And because it failed to do so, the court never honestly 
faced the question abortion raises. 
The other courts were no more honest. The lower court in Roe 
v. Wade said, "To be sure, the defendant has presented the Court 
with several compelling justifications for state presence in the 
area of abortions . . . . Concern over abortion of the 'quickened' 
fetus may well rank as ... such [an] interest."100 The court did 
not say, however, what distinguishes a quickened from an un-
quickened fetus that the state may protect one but not the other. 
If the court thought an unquickened fetus is nothing, then it was 
blinking at facts. If the court thought the fetus is something, but 
is too insubstantial to count, then it needed to explain why. In 
Doe v. Scott101 and Abele v. Markle, 102 the courts insinuated that 
all of what hangs in the balance is something grotesque, by la-
menting fetuses that would be born gravely defective or that re-
sulted from rape. Those situations are undeniably tragic, but 
97. Ely, supra note 2, at 931. 
98. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 967-68, 458 P.2d 194, 202-03, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362-63 (1969) 
(footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970). 
99. See Epstein, supra note 3, at 175. 
100. 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1223 (N.D. Tex. 1970), afld. in part and revd. in part, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973). 
101. 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1391 (N.D. Ill. 1971), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 950 
(1973). 
102. 342 F. Supp. 800, 804 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 951 
(1973). , 
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invoking them does not honestly characterize all fetuses. Yet the 
Scott and Abele courts, rapt in their discomfort, allowed them-
selves to avoid admitting that anything not grotesque was at 
stake. In Doe v. Bolton, the court acknowledged that "[o]nce 
conception takes place and an embryo forms, for better or for 
worse the woman carries a life form with the potential of indepen-
dent human existence."103 That potentiality, the court said, 
grants to the state "a legitimate area of control,"104 so long as the 
controls "do not restrict the reasons for the initial decisions" to 
abort. 105 That assessment of the fetus differs only superficially 
from Belous's or the lower-court Roe's. By leaving unexplained 
the limit on the state's interest, the court denied that anything 
counterbalances the woman's right just as effectively as Belous 
and Roe did when they diverted themselves with questions about 
what a fetus is or resembles. One court, Babbitz v. McCann, at 
least tried to be honest: "For the purposes of this decision, we 
think it is sufficient to conclude that the mother's interests are 
superior to that of an unquickened embryo, whether the embryo 
is mere protoplasm, as the plaintiff contends, or a human being, 
as the Wisconsin statute declares."108 Why the woman's interests 
prevail, however, is unexplained. 
In sum, the resort to questions like "Is a fetus a person?" "To 
what extent do other statutes protect fetuses?" and "Is a fetus 
alive?" did more to divert the courts from their analytic duties 
than to answer the question before them. One of the last pre-Roe 
cases, Abele v. Markle, realized that fact, and dismissed in a 
footnote the comparisons to other statutes.107 Perhaps if the Su-
preme Court had allowed the abortion dispute to brew longer, 
more courts would have faced the question and offered guidance 
when the Court finally decided a case. That it rushed into this 
darkness to decide Roe, only to fail to add new illumination, 
simply adds to the impression that the Court should have heeded 
the traditional axioms. 
The Court concluded its discussion of Texas's statutory 
claim by remarking, "In short, the unborn have never been recog-
103. 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1055 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (emphasis original), modified and affd., 
410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
104. 319 F. Supp. at 1055. 
105. 319 F. Supp. at 1056. 
106. Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293, 301 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed per 
curiam, 400 U.S. 1 (1970). 
107. Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224, 226 n.5 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated and 
remanded, 410 U.S. 951 (1973). 
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nized in the law as persons in the whole sense."108 This regrettable 
sentence first appeared in Byrn v. New York City Health & Hos-
pitals Corp. 109 After noting that fetuses may acquire some rights 
even before birth, the Byrn court said, "But unborn children have 
never been recognized as persons in the law in the whole sense."110 
In context, the import of this sentence is quite clear. The Byrn 
court meant that even if fetuses receive some protection, they 
have never received all the protection people receive after birth. 
The Supreme Court, by using the sentence to end the entire sec-
tion on Texas's interests, and by prefixing to it "In short," which 
clearly signals that a summary definitive statement should fol-
low, managed to obscure what little meaning the sentence has. 
The traditional axiom recommends that the Court use lower-
court arguments to its benefit; in this instance the Court adopted 
the argument so cryptically that it lost any potential benefits. 
E. ''[W}e do not agree that, by adopting one theory of 
l ·r. ,, i1e .... 
Having decided in section IX that a fetus is neither a four-
teenth amendment "person," nor a "person in the whole sense," 
the Supreme Court opened section X with, "In view of all this, 
we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may 
override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake."111 
This is a curious statement. If read out of context, it would seem 
to suggest that Roe is a case about the limits of state authority 
to regulate activity by deciding metaphysical questions. For ac-
cording to this statement, the Court did not object to Texas's end 
- prohibiting abortions - but to its means - "adopting one 
theory of life." But that suggestion seems untenable if the state-
ment is read in context, for nothing preceding it in the opinion 
discussed what theories a state may or may not endorse in the 
course of regulation, nor did the opinion say anything about 
states adopting theories when it subsequently announced its 
schema of permissible regulation. What, then, is the phrase, "by 
adopting one theory of life" doing there? One fairly plausible 
answer is that the phrase was meant to conceal some doctrinal 
sleight of hand. The Court surely wanted to avoid explicitly inval-
108. 410 U.S. at 162. 
109. 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887,335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972), appeal dismissed, 410 
U.S. 949 (1973). 
110. 31 N.Y.2d at 200, 286 N.E.2d at 888, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 392. 
111. 410 U.S. at 162. 
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idating Texas's legislative goal, even if that is what the Court was 
doing. Conveniently for the Court, Texas's brief justified protect-
ing fetuses from the moment of conception by arguing that that 
is when life begins and that the state has a duty to protect life. 112 
Thus, although objecting to the goal, the Court could attack the 
means - verbally if not analytically. Obviously, the sleight of 
hand was not very deft. 
There may be a second, less cynical explanation for the 
phrase. By looking to the nature of Texas's interest - one that 
adopted a theory of life - the Supreme Court might have been 
suggesting a rationale similar to the unique theory developed in 
Abele v. Markle. 113 That theory grew from a legislative-judicial 
dialogue that- may well have continued had the Supreme Court 
not decided Roe. In April 1972, a three-judge district court struck 
down Connecticut's restrictive abortion statute, 114 with one of the 
two majority judges expressly declining to decide how he would 
have voted had the state persuasively shown that an interest in 
. protecting fetuses originally motivated the statute's enactment. 115 
One month later, the Connecticut General Assembly enacted a 
substantially identical statute with a new first section declaring, 
"The public policy of the state and the intent of the legislature 
is to protect and preserve human life from the moment of concep-
tion .... " 116 When this new statute was challep.ged, the Abele 
court responded by considering "whether the state has power to 
advance such a purpose" by abridging a constitutional right. 117 In 
the course of its consideration, the court, rather than attaching 
or withholding the label "compelling," attempted the difficult 
task of articulating the nature of a compelling state interest: 
A compelling state interest has generally been one where the na-
ture of the interest was broadly accepted, with dispute remaining 
only as to whether the state could constitutionally advance that 
interest by the specific means being challenged . 
. . . No decision of the Supreme Court has ever permitted 
anyone's constitutional right to be directly abridged to protect a 
state interest which is subject to such a variety of personal judg-
ments [as is Connecticut's interest in protecting life from concep-
112. Brief for Appellee at 31, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
113. 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 951 (1973). 
114. Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 
U.S. 951 (1973). 
115. 342 F. Supp. at 810 (Newman, J., concurring). 
116. 351 F. Supp. at "226. 
117. 351 F. Supp. at 227. 
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tion on] . . . . Such an interest cannot acquire the force of a 
governmental decree to abridge an individual's constitutional 
right. To uphold such a statute would permit the state to impose 
its view of the nature of a fetus upon those who have the constitu-
tional right to base an important decision in their personal lives 
upon a different view. 
. . . Of course, legislation is not rendered unconstitutional 
simply because it advances a social policy about which people 
differ. Normally it is the legislative function to resolve such differ-
ences. But where a state interest subject to such variety of view-
points is asserted on behalf of a fetus which lacks constitutional 
rights, and where the assertion of such an interest would accom-
plish the virtually total abridgment of a constitutional right of 
special significance, in these circumstances such a state interest 
cannot prevail. 118 
Pursuant to this test, the Abele court again struck down Connect-
icut's statute, but also suggested the type of abortion statute this 
test would allow: 
If a statute sought to protect the lives of all fetuses which 
could survive outside the uterus, such a statute would be a legisla-
tive acceptance of the concept of viability . . . . [T]he state in-
terest in protecting the life of a fetus capable of living outside the 
uterus could be shown to be more generally accepted and, there-
fore, of more weight in the constitutional sense than the interest 
in preventing the abortion of a fetus that is not viable. 119 
The Supreme Court's otherwise inexplicable discussion of 
state interests in Roe can be read, with some imagination, to 
suggest a similar argument.120 Texas claimed just what Connecti-
118. 351 F. Supp. at 230-31 (citations omitted). 
119. 351 F. Supp. at 232 (footnote omitted). 
120. Of course, the Court cited in Roe all the lower court decisions, 410 U.S. at 164-
55, but it seems clear that the Court was particularly familiar with Abele, for part "A" of 
Roe's § IX contains striking verbal and organizational parallels to Abele's part "A." 
Organizationally, both opinions marshalled the same evidence to argue that a fetus is not 
a fourteenth amendment "person": that other constitutional uses of "person" do not apply 
to fetuses, compare 410 U.S. at 157 with 351 F. Supp. at 229 n.8; that courts which had 
addressed the issue had held that fetuses are not "persons," compare 410 U.S. at 168 with 
351 F. Supp. at 228; and that United States v. Vuitch had implied that fetuses are not 
"persons," compare 410 U.S. at 159 with 351 F. Supp. at 228. No other lower-court opinion 
adduces the same three points. Verbally, Roe echoed Abele's language three times: (1) 
it described Vuitch's implication with similar words, see text at notes 84-86 supra; (2) its 
statement of the first claim it considered - "that the fetus is a 'person' within the 
language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment," 410 U.S. at 166 - resembled 
Abele's "The initial inquiry is whether the fetus is a person, within the meaning of the 
fourteenth amendment ... ," 351 F. Supp. at 228; and (3) its reference to "those few 
cases where the issue was squarely presented," 410 U.S. at 158, resembled Abele'a refer-
ence to the two courts in which "[t)he issue has been squarely faced." 361 F. Supp. at 
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cut had: that "life begins at conception and is present throughout 
pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a compelling inter-
est in protecting that life from and after conception."121 The Court 
said two things in response. First: "It should be sufficient to note 
briefly the wide divergence of thinking on this most sensitive and 
difficult question."122 Unfortunately, the Court left ambiguous 
exactly what the wide divergence of thinking suffices to show. 
Perhaps this survey of opinion suffices to show that "the judicia-
ry, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not 
in a position to speculate" about when life begins. 123 The survey 
also suffices to show, however; that Texas's state interest rests on 
a theory that many people, including no doubt many pregnant 
women, sincerely reject. Second: "In areas other than criminal 
abortion, the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that 
life, as we recognize it, begins before live birth . . . . " 124 Professor 
Ely is surely right that if the Court was trying to show why Texas 
may not protect fetuses before viability, then "the bodies of doc-
trine to which the Court adverts . . . tend to undercut rather 
than support its conclusion."125 If, on the other hand, the Court 
was trying to suggest that a compelling state interest may not 
depend on a premise so widely disputed as that life begins at 
conception, then revealing that no other doctrines or statutes 
endorse that premise does support its conclusion. Finally, like the 
Abele court, the Supreme Court designated viability as "the 
'compelling' point."128 It explained: "This is so because the fetus 
then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the 
mother's womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after via-
bility thus has both logical and biological justifications."127 While 
the Court does not appear to suggest that it selected viability 
because Texas's interest would then be "more generally ac-
cepted,"128 which is how Abele decided on viability, it does seem 
228. Of course the verbal and organizational parallels do not prove much, especially the 
verbal ones, for judges borrow language from each other like brothers borrow socks: con-
stantly, if not openly. But they do suggest that the Supreme Court knew more about Abele 
than its holding. 
121. 410 U.S. at 159; Brief for Appellee, supra note 112. 
122. 410 U.S. at 160. 
123. 410 U.S. at 159. 
124. 410 U.S. at 161. 
125. Ely, supra note 2, at 925. 
126. 410 U.S. at 163. . 
127. 410 U.S. at 163. 
128. Abele v. Markle,"351 F. Supp. 244,232 (D. Conn.1972), vacated and remanded, 
410 U.S. 951 (1973). 
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to find significant that by viability Texas may justify its interest 
in fetal life with more than just one debatable theory chosen from 
among many. By the time a fetus is viable, logic and biology 
dictate that the fetus, if not alive, is at least almost alive. There-
fore, to read a bit into the opinion, Texas's interest would no 
longer depend on a widely disputed premise, and by the Abele 
test could be "compelling." 
This reading of Roe is purely speculative. Indeed, seeing 
Abele's theory in Roe is like finding the hidden object drawn into 
a puzzle-picture: one must know to look for it. 129 Even if Roe does 
contain fine shadings of Abele, the opinion still leaves many ques-
tions unanswered. The best that can be said is equivocal: It is 
heartening to think that some rationale lurks behind Roe, but 
equally disheartening that after taking Roe too soon for that ra-
tionale to develop further, the Court would not say whether it 
used the rationale or not, and if not, then what rationale it did 
use. 
F. "Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches 
term .... " 
Immediately after rejecting Texas's claim to protect fetuses 
from the moment of conception, the Court granted that the state 
yet had "important and legitimate" interests in protecting 
women's health and fetuses' potential life. 130 "Each [interest] 
grows in substantiality as the woman approaches terJil and, at a 
point during pregnancy, each becomes 'compelling.' " 131 For the 
interest in protecting women's health, "the 'compelling' point" 
was approximately the end of the first trimester, "because of the 
now-established medical fact . . . that until the end of the first 
trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in 
normal childbirth."132 Thus, abortions within the first trimester 
are "free of interference by the State."133 For the interest in pro-
tecting potential life, "the 'compelling' point" was viability, be-
129. Once one begins looking, however, one finds in Roe a great many more references 
to beliefs, theories, and the divergence of thinking than one might have suspected were 
there. The opinion's first page-and-a-half, for instance, mentions attitudes, views, and 
thinking six times. 410 U.S. at 116-17. And, of course, the Court included its much-
maligned survey of "medical and medical-legal history" to show "what that history re-
veals about man's attitudes" toward abortion. 410 U.S. at 117. 
130. 410 U.S. at 162. 
131. 410 U.S. at 162-63. 
132. 410 y.S. at 163. 
133. 410 U.S. at 163. 
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cause as already mentioned, "the fetus then presumably has the 
capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb."134 
The Supreme Court must have been well acquainted with 
differentiating compellingness of state interests according to 
length of pregnancy, for most of the pre-Roe courts had done it. 
With the exception of Abele, however, none of the lower courts 
had protected the right to abortion so zealously as did the Su-
preme Court. In assessing states' interests in women's health, for 
example, the lower courts had often relied solely on statistics 
about the relative risks in abortion and childbirth to justify their 
decisions that those interests no longer warranted prohibiting 
abortions in the first trimester .135 But all the lower courts had 
expressly conceded that even in the first trimester the state could 
regulate who may perform abortions and where. 136 As to interests 
in protecting fetuses, the courts had generally found those un-
compelling during "early" pregnancy, 137 or before quickening. 138 
While the courts had rarely specified when "early" pregnancy 
134. 410 U.S. at 163. 
135. See, e.g., YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1074 (D.N.J.1972), cert. denied, 
415 U.S. 989, affd. without opinion, 493 F.2d 1402 (3d Cir. 1974); Babbitz v. McCann, 
310 F. Supp. 293, 301 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed per curiam, 400 U.S. 1 (1970); People 
v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954,965,458 P.2d 194, 200-01, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 360-61 (1969), cert. 
denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970). The statistical studies most frequently cited were by Christo-
pher Tietze. That name became so familiar in the pre-Roe cases and in the Roe briefs, 
that when the Supreme Court cited three Tietze studies among the five named sources 
that wholly supported the decision not to allow any state regulation during the first 
trimester, 410 U.S. at 149 n.44, 163, one begins to think that the due process clause of 
the fourteenth amendment enacts Dr. Christopher Tietze's Abortion Statistics. 
136. Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800,804 (D. Conn.1972), vacated and remanded, 
410 U.S. 951 (1973); YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1075-76 (D.N.J. 1972), cert. 
denied, 415 U.S. 989, affd. without opinion, 493 F.2d 1402 (3d Cir. 1974); Doe v. Scott, 
321 F. Supp. 1385, 1391 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (decision that a state interest in women's health 
is uncompelling limited to abortions "by licensed physicians in a licensed hospital"), 
vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 950 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp.1048, 1056 (N.D. 
Ga. 1970), modified and affd., 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1223 
(N.D. Tex. 1970), affd. in part and revd. in part, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Babbitz v. McCann, 
310 F. Supp. 293, 302 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed per curiam, 400 U.S. 1 (1970); 
People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 965, 458 P.2d 194, 201, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 360-61 (1969) 
(decision that state interest in women's health is uncompelling limited to "a hospital 
therapeutic abortion"), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970). 
137. Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. at 804 ("within an appropriate period after con-
ception"); Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. at 1391 ("the early stages"); Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. 
Supp. at 1055 (exactly what Bolton held is difficult to discern - indeed, after two months 
the court issued an explanatory supplemental opinion - but the plaintiffs alleged a right 
to terminate "an unwanted pregnancy in its early stages," and the court apparently 
accepted that); United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. at 1035 ("early stages"). 
138. YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. at 1075; Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. at 1223, 
Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. at 299. 
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ends, none of them except Abele139 had indicated in any way that 
it stretches to viability. 
· More important than the timing of when interests become 
compelling, however, is the fact that none of the courts - lower 
or Supreme - adequately justified differentiating by length of 
pregnancy at all. None of them explained why relative risks 
"should provide the only constitutionally relevant measure of 
permissible state regulation"140 to protect the mother's health. 
And, as seen before, most of them never honestly faced the task 
of balancing states' interests in fetuses against women's interests 
in abortion, 141 much less articulated why the state interest was 
"compelling" in late pregnancy but not in early. Thus, when the 
Supreme Court drafted what Professor Ely called its 
"commissioner's regulations."142 it went beyond any balance of 
interests it or the lower court had explained, and beyond what 
any lower court (exceptAbele) had thought necessary. To be sure, 
the Court was not wholly without models for its selection of via-
bility as "the 'compelling' point": the statutes of Alaska, Hawaii, 
and New York allowed abortions for any reason before viability. 143 
But the Court could not really have patterned its decision after 
them - that would have been judicial legislation. 
CONCLUSION 
Roe and the pre-Roe cases share many of the same faults, 
and not coincidentally. In the face of the lower courts' confusion, 
and the inadequacy of most of their attempts to evolve a constitu-
tional analysis for the abortion cases, the Supreme Court was 
doubtless tempted to ignore the traditional axioms of Supreme 
Court review, to seize the problem and resolve it itself. Roe should 
serve as a reminder that quick resolution is not always the wisest 
choice, for Roe is an opinion uninformed by any thoughtful lower-
court analysis. The Abele court's attempt to grapple with the 
difficult issues suggests that more thoughtful analysis was in the 
offing. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not wait to enjoy 
those benefits. 
139. 351 F. Supp. at 232. 
140. Tribe, supra note 5, at 4. 
141. See text at note 106 supra. 
142. Ely, supra note 2, at 922. 
143. See Comment, supra note 10, at 181. 
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